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Flexibility in Cash Flow Reporting Classification Choices under IFRS
Introduction
Generally accepted accounting principles in the United States (U.S. GAAP) are perceived to allow managers less discretion than International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). This comparatively limited discretion is apparent with regard to the classification of certain items within the statement of cash flows. U.S. GAAP requires that firms classify interest paid, interest received, and dividends received as operating cash flows. In contrast, IFRS allows firms to report these items within operating cash flow (OCF) or to classify them as investing or financing. We document variation in firms' cash flow classification choices under IFRS and examine capital market incentives and firm reporting environment characteristics explaining these choices. Cash flow, and particularly OCF, is well established as a basis for business valuation (e.g., Damodaran 2006), contracting (e.g., Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Mulford and Comiskey, 2005) , and financial analysis (Estridge and Lougee, 2007) . Although an extensive literature examines classification shifting within the income statement and within the balance sheet (Engel et al., 1999; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2005; McVay, 2006) , less attention has been given to classification variations within the statement of cash flows with Lee (2012) as a notable exception. IFRS reporting provides a setting where the accounting standards provide firms discretion in classification choices within the statement of cash flows.
The effect of discretion in cash flow classifications is important because both the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 1 share the objective that financial information should enable financial statement users to better predict future cash flows. Further, the Boards articulate the importance of both accrual accounting information and cash flow information in achieving this objective.
"Information about a reporting entity's cash flows during a period also helps users to assess the entity's ability to generate future net cash inflows. It indicates how the reporting entity obtains and spends cash, including information about its borrowing and repayment of debt, cash dividends or other cash distributions to investors, and other factors that may affect the entity's liquidity or solvency. Information about cash flows helps users understand a reporting entity's operations, evaluate its financing and investing activities, assess its liquidity or solvency and interpret other information about financial performance."
2 Despite identical objectives, the standard setters have established different requirements for presentation of certain items -interest paid, interest received, and dividends received -in the statement of cash flows. As a consequence, the amount of OCF reported by a given entity can differ under U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Theoretically, the appropriate classification of these items is open to debate. Even when deliberating the adoption of the statement of cash flows standard (SFAS 95) , the FASB discussed the 1 In IFRS, the Conceptual Framework, Chapter 1, The Objective Of General Purpose Financial Reporting ¶OB3 states: "Decisions by existing and potential investors about buying, selling or holding equity and debt instruments depend on the returns that they expect from an investment in those instruments, for example dividends, principal and interest payments or market price increases. Similarly, decisions by existing and potential lenders and other creditors about providing or settling loans and other forms of credit depend on the principal and interest payments or other returns that they expect. Investors', lenders' and other creditors' expectations about returns depend on their assessment of the amount, timing and uncertainty of (the prospects for) future net cash inflows to the entity. Consequently, existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors need information to help them assess the prospects for future net cash inflows to an entity." In U.S. GAAP, Concepts Statement No. 8 ¶ OB3 is identical. 2 IFRS Conceptual Framework, Chapter 1, ¶ OB20, which is identical to U.S. GAAP, Concepts Statement No. 8 ¶ OB20. 3 classifications of interest paid and interest received, ultimately opting to require these items be reported in the operating section. 3 In our initial sample of 798 non-financial IFRS firms in 13 European countries from 2005 to 2008, we first document variation in classification choices. About 77%, 54%, and 49% of the sample classifies interest paid, interest received, and dividends received, respectively, in OCF. Only about 60% of our sample firms report all three items in OCF. We document significant variation in classification across both countries and industries. Almost all firms in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden make the same classification choices for interest paid and interest received.
We adjust OCF to include interest paid, interest received, and dividends received (i.e., consistent with U.S. GAAP requirements). That is, we consider a hypothetical U.S. GAAP benchmark assuming that managers' real operating activities would have remained the same even if cash flow classification choices had been restricted. We do not assert these items are appropriately classified as OCF. Rather, we use U.S. GAAP as a benchmark because our main focus is on the differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. We find that reported OCF tends to be higher under IFRS than it would have been under U.S. GAAP. Similarly, investing and financing cash flows would generally have been lower under IFRS. The pair wise means, by firm, for the three cash flow amounts under IFRS versus U.S. GAAP differ significantly.
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We then explore determinants of cash flow classification choices from the perspective of OCF-increasing classifications. Lee (2012) identifies incentives to inflate reported OCF including financial distress, the probability of bankruptcy, and the existence of analysts' cash flow forecasts. We examine these incentives for making OCF-increasing choices in our setting and additionally include other capital market incentives, profitability, and firm characteristics. Further, we explore characteristics associated with the reporting environment such as country, the reporting choices of industry peers, and cross-listing in the U.S.
In our primary analysis, we quantify the effect on OCF of IFRS classification flexibility by using U.S. GAAP as a hypothetical benchmark. U.S. GAAP serves as our benchmark, given our interest in differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. Our approach is consistent with the reality faced by U.S. investors who consider investing in IFRS-reporting firms and/or comparing U.S. GAAP-reporting firms with IFRS-reporting peers. We construct two dependent variables as proxies for OCF-increasing classification choices: 1.) the amount of the difference in actually-reported OCF under IFRS relative to the benchmark of what OCF would have been under U.S. GAAP, and 2.) an indicator variable signifying a classification choice that would increase OCF under IFRS relative to U.S. GAAP. For the second of these dependent variables, we focus on the classification choice for one item, interest paid, which IFRS permits to be classified either in the operating or the financing section of the statement of cash flows. The reason to focus on interest paid is that it constitutes a relatively large amount that is commonly reported separately and thus easier to identify. When a firm classifies interest paid as financing, it follows that ceteris paribus its reported OCF will be higher than if interest paid were 5 classified as operating. Thus classification of interest paid as financing is an OCFincreasing classification choice.
We find that firms with greater likelihood of financial distress and a greater probability of default make OCF-increasing classification choices. We further show that firms accessing equity markets more frequently and those with greater contracting concerns are also more likely to make OCF-increasing classification choices. Firms with negative OCF are less likely to make OCF-increasing classification choices. Unlike Lee (2012), we find no relation between classification choices and the presence of analysts' cash flow forecast. Our inability to reject the null hypothesis of no relation is likely because cash flow forecasts are present for almost every firm in our sample, consistent with Lee's (2012) observation that the prevalence of cash flow forecasts has increased over time and the literature finding that the provision of analysts' cash flow forecasts is more pervasive in countries other than the U.S. (DeFond and Hung 2007) . We find that firms cross-listed in the United States are more likely to make classification choices that result in higher reported OCF relative to the U.S. GAAP benchmark. We find little or no effects related to industry practice, profitability, or firm size. This paper contributes to our understanding of an area in which IFRS differs from U.S. GAAP, a topic of increased importance as U.S. regulators consider adopting IFRS for public companies. While it could be argued that flexibility in cash flow classification under IFRS could lead to OCF being more informative, such flexibility could impact comparability of reported OCF, which has potentially significant implications because of the use of cash flows in valuation and contracting. 4 This study also contributes to our 6 understanding of management discretion in reporting non-earnings measures. Again, although managerial discretion in cash flow classification could be potentially helpful to financial statement users, our evidence suggests that some caution may be warranted when managers have particular incentives that affect their classification choices.
Our study should be of interest to various audiences. Researchers studying IFRS and using reported OCF as a variable of interest should be concerned with cash flow classification choices if their results would be contingent on these choices. For instance, researchers comparing OCF and other performance measures (e.g., Bernard and Stober, 1989; Sloan, 1996; Ashbaugh and Olsson, 2002; Orpurt and Zang, 2009; Barton et al., 2010) should potentially be interested in the effects of classification on their estimates.
Financial statement users may benefit from understanding whether and how a manager's choice of classifications on the statement of cash flows relates to reporting incentives and firm characteristics (Carslaw and Mills, 1991) . Standard setters can potentially utilize an understanding of the factors associated with a firm's reporting choices when crafting standards that permit alternatives.
Our study also has potential implications for the debate over costs and benefits of comparability and uniformity (De Franco et al., 2011) 
OCF-Increasing Classification Choices, Incentives and the Reporting Environment
We explore incentives and reporting environment factors related to reporting higher OCF.
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We expect that firms closer to financial distress and with a higher probability of default are motivated to report higher OCF (consistent with findings in Lee 2012)
because OCF is an important measure in assessing credit and default risk (Beaver 1966 , Ohlson 1980 , DeFond and Hung 2003 . Our proxy for financial distress is Altman's Zscore (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006). 6 A higher Z-score corresponds to a lower risk of 8 financial distress, so we expect a negative relation. Our proxy for the probability of default is credit ratings. Because not all firms in our sample are rated, we estimate credit ratings similar to Barth et al. (2008) , as discussed in Appendix A. A higher credit rating implies a lower risk of default, so we predict a negative relation.
Arguably, firms accessing equity markets more frequently have stronger incentive to inflate OCF to increase the amount of capital they can raise. Therefore, we expect these firms are more likely to make classifications that enhance their reported OCF. Our proxy for capital market incentives is equity issuances. We expect that the more firms opt to access the equity markets, the stronger incentives they have to report higher OCF.
Thus, we expect a positive relation between equity issues and OCF-increasing classification choices.
We predict that firms with contracting concerns and costs involved in renegotiating debt covenants will also seek to report higher OCF. Our proxy for contracting concerns is leverage, computed as total liabilities divided by total assets. We predict a positive relation.
We expect that profitable firms and firms with negative OCF are more likely to make OCF-increasing classification choices, similar to incentives to report positive rather than negative earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Reporting higher OCF reinforces the assessment of profitability. Those firms with negative OCF would report less negative, or even positive, cash flows by reporting items like interest paid outside of the operating section. 7 So, we expect a positive relation between both profitability and negative OCF.
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We examine three explanatory variables related to the firm's information environment: 1.) the availability of analysts' cash flow forecast, 2.) industry practice, and Therefore, we predict the greater the homogeneity of firms' classification choices within an industry, the more likely any given firm will follow. Bradshaw et al. (2004) argue that firms that are cross-listed in the United States have stronger incentives to adopt similar reporting choices as U.S. companies. Therefore we expect that cross-listed firms are less likely to classify items such as interest paid in financing, which is not allowed under U.S.
GAAP.
We include size to capture financial reporting incentives, financial reporting expertise, and the financial reporting environment of large versus small firms. We do not have a prediction for its sign. Finally, we include indicator variables for country and industry.
Because the classification decisions are fairly stable over time, we use one observation per firm and summarize data available during the sample period to compute the variables in the model. To examine the relation between the variables described above and the magnitude of the effect of IFRS-permitted classification choices, we estimate an OLS regression model with the dependent variable constructed as the difference between OCF as reported and OCF as adjusted (if needed) for consistency with U.S. GAAP classification requirements. To examine the relation between the variables described above and the likelihood of an OCF-enhancing classification choice,
we estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if interest paid is reported in the financing section and zero otherwise.
Sample Selection and Classification Choices
Sample Selection
We select a sample of non-financial firms in 13 European countries that adopted IFRS in 2005. The dividends-received amount is primarily classified in operating and investing, at 49% and 48%, respectively, as shown in Table 3 , panel A. All observations from Sweden and about 89% of the sample in Austria classify dividends received as operating.
Description of Classification Choices
In contrast, 98% of the Portuguese firms in our sample classify dividends received in investing. About 4% of the sample classifies dividends received as a financing cash flow, inconsistent with guidance in IAS 7, Statement of Cash Flows, paragraph 33.
Panel B of Table 3 shows cash flow classifications by industry. 14 Classification choices for interest paid across industries are more concentrated than across countries.
The percentage of the sample classifying interest paid in financing ranges from 14% for durable manufactures to 30% for transportation and utilities. In all industries, 70% or more of firms classify interest paid as operating.
For interest received, again, durable manufacturers have the highest percentage of firms classifying interest received in operating, with 67% of the sample making this 14 choice. In the other industries, 43% to 61% of the sample firms classify interest received in operating.
Finally, for dividends received, the pharmaceutical industry exhibits homogeneity in classifying, with 100% reporting dividends received in investing. The Retail industry follows with 68% classifying dividends received in operating. Table 5 reports 
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
OLS Regression Model
Results using differences in OCF as the dependent variable are presented in Table   7 . Because Distress and Credit Rating are positively and significantly correlated, we include these variables in separate regressions. We find that Distress (where a higher value implies a more remote likelihood of financial distress) and Credit Rating (where a higher value implies a better credit rating) are each negatively and significantly related to
OCF_Reported less OCF_Pro forma_USGAAP , suggesting firms that are less financially distressed and less likely to default are less likely to make classification choices that result in higher OCF, consistent with our expectations. Our results also show that Equity
Issues is positive and significant, suggesting that firms that access equity markets more frequently opt to make classification choices to report higher OCF. Leverage is also significantly positive, indicating that firms with greater leverage are more likely to make classification choices to show higher OCF. Firms with negative operating cash flows are less likely to make classification choices that increase OCF, opposite to expectations. It appears that those firms that already are reporting negative OCF are not sensitive to reporting less negative OCF.
We also find that those firms cross-listed in the U.S. are more likely to make OCF-enhancing classification choices, contrary to our expectations based on Bradshaw et 
Logit Regression Model
Sensitivity and Robustness Checks
Firms Changing Classifications
In our sample, we identify 65 firms, or 8%, that change their classifications during the sample period. Appendix B provides descriptive information on the classification changes made, comparisons to the full sample, and comparisons of the firm before and after the change. We also include an example of the cash flow effects of firm changing classifications. We perform regression similar to those in tables 7 and 8 computing the change in each variable, when possible (not tabulated). The evidence is directionally similar but weaker than in our main tables with none of the variables being significant at conventional levels. Given the small sample size and the change specification, the weaker results are not surprising.
Additional Analyses and Variables
Data on auditors indicate that 88% of our full sample of 798 firms are audited by a Big auditor (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or PwC). We include an indicator variable for each of these four big auditors in our regressions, and none of the indicator variables are significant (not tabulated). This result indicates that classification choice is not associated with choice of auditor.
We also examine the effect of including other variables but none are significant:
average market-to-book ratio, average returns, an indicator variable for high debt (over the median), an indicator variable for earnings that are the just positive, the variability of OCF, computed as the standard deviation of the firm's OCF over the sample period, and capital intensity which captures structure of operations and potential financing needs.
When we include only observations with interest paid located on the face of or in the footnotes to the financial statements (about 70% of the sample), regression results are similar to the overall reported results.
We also reviewed the classification choices of a larger set of cross-listed firms to determine whether the results on the cross-listing variable are generalizable to a broader set of cross-listing firms. We collected data on 83 European Union cross-listed firms in 2006 (including some of the 40 cross-listed firms in our sample), and we find the classification choice for interest paid is similar to our overall sample: 78% reporting in operating and 22% in financing.
Summary and Conclusion
Cash flow, and particularly OCF, is used in business valuation and contracting.
However, OCF can be measured differently under IFRS and U.S. GAAP because of classification alternative available under IFRS. While previous international accounting research focuses on IFRS versus U.S. GAAP differences in earnings and shareholders' equity, little attention has been given to potential differences in OCF under the two sets of standards.
Using our international setting, we build on and extend certain findings from a U.S.-only setting (Lee 2012). We find that firms with a higher likelihood of financial distress and the probability of bankruptcy are more likely to use make OCF-increasing classification choices. We find no relation between classification choices and the presence of analysts' cash flow forecast, a finding we attribute to the almost universal presence of such forecasts. Beyond these factors, we find that firms with average negative cash flows over a period of time do not make OCF-increasing choices, suggesting that classification shifting would not improve their appearance of better performance. Interestingly, we also find that cross-listed firms are less likely to make OCF classification choices similar to U.S. GAAP. Understanding the impact of non-comparability on such metrics will facilitate appropriate inferences from research incorporating these metrics. 
Variable Definitions:
OCF_Reported t is operating cash flows as reported by the firm in time t.
OCF_Pro forma_USGAAP t is operating cash flows in time t adjusted to include interest paid, interest received, and dividends received in operating cash flows if these items are not already reported in the operating section. INV_Reported t is investing cash flows as reported by the firm in time t.
INV_Pro forma_USGAAP t is investing cash flows in time t adjusted to exclude interest paid, interest received, and dividends received. FIN_Reported t is financing cash flows as reported by the firm in time t.
FIN_Pro forma_USGAAP t is financing cash flows in time t adjusted to exclude interest paid, interest received, and dividends received. All firm subscripts are omitted. All variables are scaled by the firm's total assets. Distress is financial distress computed using Altman's Z-score.
Credit Rating is the S&P credit rating estimated similar to Barth et al. (2008) grouped into quartiles, with 1 as the lowest rating and 4 the highest. We use actual credit ratings when available. Equity Issues is the percent change in the firm's contributed capital over the sample period. Debt Issues is the percent change in the firm's long-term debt over the sample period. Profitability is the firm's net income divided by beginning total assets, averaged over the sample period.
Leverage is the firm's ratio of total liabilities over total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year, averaged over the sample period.
Analysts Cash Flow Forecast is an indicator variable equal to 1 if at least one analyst's cash flow forecast is available on IBES and 0 otherwise, averaged over the sample period.
Negative Cash Flows is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reports negative operating cash flows and 0 otherwise, averaged over the sample period. Industry Homogeneity is the percent of firms within an industry that report interest paid in financing cash flows, with industry classifications based on Barth et al. (1998) .
Cross-listed in US is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the United States and 0 otherwise. Size is the log of the firm's beginning total assets, averaged over the sample period. SP is the firm's S&P credit rating; TA is the natural logarithm of end-of-year total assets; ROA is net income divided by total assets; DBTA is debt to assets ratio, and DIV, and NEG are indicator variables that equal 1 if in year t the firm pays a cash dividend, or has negative ROA. 18 We omit firm-specific subscripts.
We set Credit Rating, our proxy for credit risk, equal to the predicted value from Equation (A1) for firms without credit ratings.
Estimating Equation (A1)
Due the limited availability of historical credit ratings for non-U.S. companies on commercially available databases, we collect credit ratings from Standard and Poors' website 19 in January 2011. We estimate Equation (A1) with the 2011 credit ratings and 2010 fiscal year data, the most recent year of available data. We include industry fixed effects.
20
SP ranges from 1 to 4, where larger SP corresponds to lower risk; groups 4, 3, 2, and 1 include firms with ratings of AAA to A-_, BBB+_ to BBB-, BB+ to BB-_, and B_ to D, respectively.
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Because SP has integer values, we use maximum likelihood estimation and an ordered probit model. We predict a 1 , a 2 , and a 4 are positive, and a 3 , and a 5 are negative. Table A , Panel A, presents regression summary statistics from Equation (A1) for the 173 observations for firms with credit ratings and financial statement data. Consistent with prior research, S&P credit ratings, SP, are significantly positively related to TA, ROA, and DIV, and significantly negatively related to DBTA and NEG. The pseudo R-squared from the estimation is 0.58, indicating that these variables explain a substantial portion of the variation in credit ratings. Table A , Panel B, presents the distributions of actual credit rating levels and changes and the distributions of estimated credit risk levels and changes. The distributions are similar, except in group 4 there are more firms with estimated credit risk (52.0 %) than with actual ratings (28.3%). In group 3, there are fewer firms with the estimated credit rating (45.1%) compared to actual 2 (21.9%) percent of firms. Panel B also reveals the change in credit rating group from actual to predicted, with about 48.0% being accurately predicted, about 35% higher and 17% being lower. Finally, we find that the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between the actual and predicted credit ratings is 0.708 (0.683) and significant with a p-value of 0.00 (0.00). 
Empirical Estimates
APPENDIX B DESCRIPTION OF FIRMS CHANGING CLASSIFICATIONS
In our sample, we identify 65 firms, or 8%, that change their classifications during the sample period. Table B , Panel A, indicates that the greatest numbers of reclassifications are moving interest paid out of OCF. The 65 changers represent 11 of the 13 sample countries, with the greatest number of changers in the United Kingdom (14) and Spain (12) (not tabulated).
Companies in all industries, except Chemicals, made changes with the greatest number in Durable manufacturers (10) (not tabulated).
We next compare descriptive statistic for variables from our regression for the change subsample to the rest of the sample (the number of changer observations decreases to 59 due to data requirements to compute variables) in Table B , Panel B. We find that means and medians of the difference in OCF and leverage are significantly greater in the changer subsample. The medians of the interest paid reported in financing and equity issues are also significant greater.
When we compare the changer sample to itself before and after the change in Table B , Panel C, we find significant differences in the means of the difference in OCF, interest paid reported in financing, leverage, negative cash flows and analysts' forecast coverage.
The exhibit presents an example of a company, Norse Energy Corp. ASA, a Norwegian gas explorer and producer that changed its classifications of interest paid and interest received in 2007. It changed its classification of interest paid to financing from operating. It changed its classification of interest received to investing from operating. The net effect of these changes was to report positive, rather than negative operating cash flows, in both 2007 and 2008. 
